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The Proposed U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] The proposed U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, also called the U.S.-Colombia Free 
Trade Agreement (CFTA), was signed by the United States and Colombia on November 22, 2006. The 
agreement must be approved by Congress before it can enter into force. Upon congressional approval, it 
would immediately eliminate duties on 80% of U.S. exports of consumer and industrial products to 
Colombia. An additional 7% of U.S. exports would receive duty-free treatment within five years of 
implementation, and most remaining tariffs would be eliminated within 10 years of implementation. The 
agreement also contains other provisions in services, investment, intellectual property rights protection, 
labor, and the environment. About 90% of U.S. imports from Colombia enter the United States duty-free 
under trade preference programs or through normal trade relations, while U.S. exports to Colombia face 
duties of up to 20%. 
It is possible that the 112th may consider implementing legislation for the proposed CFTA. Negotiations 
for the agreement were conducted under the trade promotion authority (TPA), also called fast-track trade 
authority, that Congress granted the President under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002 (P.L. 
107-210). The authority allowed the President to enter into trade agreements that would receive expedited 
congressional consideration (no amendments and limited debate). Implementing legislation for the CFTA 
(H.R. 5724/S. 2830) was introduced in the 110th Congress on April 8, 2008, under TPA. The House 
leadership, however, took the position that the President had submitted the implementing legislation 
without adequately fulfilling the TPA requirement for consultation with Congress. On April 10, 2008, the 
House voted 224-195 to make the provisions establishing expedited procedures, inapplicable to the CFTA 
implementing legislation (H.Res. 1092). 
In his January 2011 State of the Union address, President Barack Obama mentioned the importance of 
opening foreign markets for U.S. goods and services, and strengthening U.S. trade relations with 
Colombia. In 2010, the Administration initiated a new National Export Initiative (NEI), which includes a 
component that calls for opening new markets for U.S. exports by resolving outstanding issues on the 
pending CFTA. The Obama Administration also has made a case for pursuing free trade agreements as 
part of the National Security Strategy of the United States, though the CFTA is not specifically mentioned 
in the report. 
The congressional debate surrounding the agreement has mostly centered on the violence issues in 
Colombia. Some members of Congress oppose the agreement because of concerns about violence 
against union members and other terrorist activity in Colombia. However, numerous members of 
Congress support the CFTA and take issue with these charges, stating that Colombia has made progress 
in recent years to curb the violence in the country. They also contend that the agreement would open the 
Colombian market for U.S. exporters. Other policymakers argue that Colombia is a crucial ally of the 
United States in Latin America and that if the trade agreement is not passed, it may lead to further 
violence in the region. For Colombia, a free trade agreement with the United States is part of its overall 
economic development strategy. 
The United States is Colombia’s leading trade partner. Colombia accounts for a very small percentage of 
U.S. trade (0.8% in 2009), ranking 22nd among U.S. export markets and 27th as a source of U.S. imports. 
Economic studies on the impact of a U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement (FTA) have found that, upon full 
implementation of an agreement, the impact on the United States would be positive but very small due to 
the small size of the Colombian economy when compared to that of the United States (about 1.6%). 
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Summary 
The proposed U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, also called the U.S.-Colombia Free 
Trade Agreement (CFTA), was signed by the United States and Colombia on November 22, 2006. 
The agreement must be approved by Congress before it can enter into force. Upon congressional 
approval, it would immediately eliminate duties on 80% of U.S. exports of consumer and 
industrial products to Colombia. An additional 7% of U.S. exports would receive duty-free 
treatment within five years of implementation, and most remaining tariffs would be eliminated 
within 10 years of implementation. The agreement also contains other provisions in services, 
investment, intellectual property rights protection, labor, and the environment. About 90% of U.S. 
imports from Colombia enter the United States duty-free under trade preference programs or 
through normal trade relations, while U.S. exports to Colombia face duties of up to 20%.  
It is possible that the 112th may consider implementing legislation for the proposed CFTA. 
Negotiations for the agreement were conducted under the trade promotion authority (TPA), also 
called fast-track trade authority, that Congress granted the President under the Bipartisan Trade 
Promotion Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210). The authority allowed the President to enter into trade 
agreements that would receive expedited congressional consideration (no amendments and 
limited debate). Implementing legislation for the CFTA (H.R. 5724/S. 2830) was introduced in 
the 110th Congress on April 8, 2008, under TPA. The House leadership, however, took the 
position that the President had submitted the implementing legislation without adequately 
fulfilling the TPA requirement for consultation with Congress. On April 10, 2008, the House 
voted 224-195 to make the provisions establishing expedited procedures, inapplicable to the 
CFTA implementing legislation (H.Res. 1092).  
In his January 2011 State of the Union address, President Barack Obama mentioned the 
importance of opening foreign markets for U.S. goods and services, and strengthening U.S. trade 
relations with Colombia. In 2010, the Administration initiated a new National Export Initiative 
(NEI), which includes a component that calls for opening new markets for U.S. exports by 
resolving outstanding issues on the pending CFTA. The Obama Administration also has made a 
case for pursuing free trade agreements as part of the National Security Strategy of the United 
States, though the CFTA is not specifically mentioned in the report.  
The congressional debate surrounding the agreement has mostly centered on the violence issues 
in Colombia. Some members of Congress oppose the agreement because of concerns about 
violence against union members and other terrorist activity in Colombia. However, numerous 
members of Congress support the CFTA and take issue with these charges, stating that Colombia 
has made progress in recent years to curb the violence in the country. They also contend that the 
agreement would open the Colombian market for U.S. exporters. Other policymakers argue that 
Colombia is a crucial ally of the United States in Latin America and that if the trade agreement is 
not passed, it may lead to further violence in the region. For Colombia, a free trade agreement 
with the United States is part of its overall economic development strategy. 
The United States is Colombia’s leading trade partner. Colombia accounts for a very small 
percentage of U.S. trade (0.8% in 2009), ranking 22nd among U.S. export markets and 27th as a 
source of U.S. imports. Economic studies on the impact of a U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement 
(FTA) have found that, upon full implementation of an agreement, the impact on the United 
States would be positive but very small due to the small size of the Colombian economy when 
compared to that of the United States (about 1.6%). 
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Introduction 
The proposed U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, also called the U.S.-Colombia Free 
Trade Agreement (CFTA), is a bilateral free trade agreement between the United States and 
Colombia which, if ratified, would eliminate tariffs and other barriers in goods and services 
between the two countries. The CFTA negotiations grew out of a regional effort in 2004 to 
produce a U.S.-Andean free trade agreement (FTA) between the United States and the Andean 
countries of Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador. After numerous rounds of talks, negotiators failed to 
reach an agreement, and Colombia continued negotiations with the United States for a bilateral 
FTA. On February 27, 2006, the United States and Colombia concluded the U.S.-Colombia FTA, 
and finalized the text of the agreement on July 8, 2006. On August 24, 2006, President Bush 
notified Congress of his intention to sign the U.S.-Colombia FTA. The two countries signed the 
agreement on November 22, 2006. 
On April 8, 2008, President George W. Bush submitted implementing legislation for the United 
States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act (H.R. 5724/S. 2830) in the 
110th Congress. The bills were introduced under the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) provisions 
of the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210). This act made expedited legislative procedures 
established in § 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618) available for congressional 
consideration of legislation to implement free trade agreements negotiated under TPA. The House 
leadership took the position that President Bush had submitted the legislation to implement the 
CFTA without adequately fulfilling the TPA requirements for consultation with Congress, and on 
April 10, 2008, the House, by a vote of 224-195, adopted H.Res. 1092, making certain provisions 
of the expedited procedure inapplicable to the CFTA implementing legislation. 
The 112th Congress may consider implementing legislation for the proposed U.S.-Colombia FTA. 
In his January 2011 State of the Union address, President Barack Obama stated his intent to 
“strengthen” U.S. trade relations with Colombia. In 2010, the Administration initiated a new 
National Export Initiative (NEI)to boost U.S. exports and create jobs. One component of the NEI 
calls for opening new markets for U.S. exports by resolving outstanding issues with three pending 
FTAs at the appropriate time.1  
Trade Promotion Authority 
Under the statutory procedures, known as “trade promotion authority” or “TPA” and sometimes 
called “fast track” procedures, Congress has a maximum of 90 days to consider the implementing 
legislation, the measure is privileged for consideration, the length of consideration is limited, and 
amendments are precluded.2 The House must act first on the bill, because the legislation would 
affect revenue, and under the act it must do so within 60 days; the Senate cannot act until the bill 
passes the House. The Senate could, nevertheless, take up and pass its own implementing bill, 
                                                             
 
1
 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “President Obama Details Administration Efforts to Support Two 
Million New Jobs by Promoting New Exports,” March 11, 2010.  
2
 For more information on Trade Promotion Authority, see CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) 
and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy, by J. F. Hornbeck and William H. Cooper. 
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then hold it at the desk pending the arrival of the House companion. In that case, however, the 
expedited procedures of the statute (limiting debate, precluding amendment, etc.) would not be 
applicable for the Senate’s consideration of its measure (except by unanimous consent). 
The adoption of H.Res. 1092 in the 110th Congress removed the obligation for the House to vote 
on the CFTA within 60 days of session, although the House leadership retained the ability to 
schedule a vote at any time under the general rules of the House. If it chose to do so, 
consideration most likely would have occurred pursuant to a special rule reported by the 
Committee on Rules and adopted by the House, which would presumably establish terms for 
consideration similar to those directed by the TPA. H.Res. 1092 did not change the TPA 
provisions that the CFTA was not amendable once it came up (although in principle, this 
restriction could be altered by the terms of a special rule for considering the implementing bill). 
Nor did it alter the applicability of TPA rules in the Senate. 
The adoption of H.Res. 1092 suspended the TPA provision requiring that the committees of 
jurisdiction automatically be discharged from the U.S.-Colombia FTA implementing bill if they 
had not reported it by 45 days of session after its introduction. It also removed the TPA provision 
that making a motion to proceed to consideration of the bill is highly privileged and not 
debatable, thereby restoring the normal control exercised by the leadership over the floor 
schedule if the committees of consideration were to report the implementing bill. 
Because the 110th Congress did not consider implementing legislation for the CFTA, 
implementing legislation is not necessarily eligible for “fast track” consideration in the 112th 
Congress. Under TPA, a trade agreement and its implementing legislation can be submitted to 
Congress pursuant to the act only once, and it is the President’s initial submission of the 
agreement that triggers the 90-day process under expedited procedures. For this reason, it is 
generally understood that the eligibility of the CFTA for expedited consideration under the statute 
would not carry over or be renewed in a subsequent Congress, although this procedural point has 
not been “officially tested,” because the Speaker has made no formal ruling on the matter from 
the chair.3 The CFTA implementing legislation, however, could still be re-introduced in the 111th 
Congress under the general rules of both houses, and could be considered in the House under a 
TPA-like procedure pursuant to a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and approved 
by the House. 
Rationale for the Agreement 
Since the 1990s, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have been a focus of U.S. 
trade policy as demonstrated by the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, the Dominican Republic-Central America Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), and the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement. The Bush 
Administration made bilateral and regional trade agreements key elements of U.S. trade policy. 
U.S. trade policy in the Western Hemisphere over the past few years has been focused on 
completing trade negotiations with Colombia, Peru, and Panama and on gaining passage of these 
                                                             
 
3
 Inside U.S. Trade, “House Approves Fast-Track Rules Change for U.S.-Colombia FTA,” April 11, 2008. 
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free trade agreements by the U.S. Congress. The U.S.-Peru FTA was approved by Congress and 
signed into law in December 2007 (P.L. 110-138).4 
A free trade agreement with Colombia would increase market access for U.S. goods and services 
in the Colombian market, currently not the case under the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA). 
ATPA is a unilateral trade preference program in which the United States extends preferential 
duty treatment to select Colombian goods entering the United States. It is part of a broader U.S. 
initiative with Latin America to address the illegal drug issue (see section on ATPA later in this 
report). About 90% of U.S. imports from Colombia enter the United States duty-free under ATPA, 
under other U.S. trade preferences, or through normal trade relations. 
The major expectation among proponents of the pending free trade agreement with Colombia, as 
with other trade agreements, is that it would provide economic benefits for both the United States 
and Colombia as the level of trade increases between the two countries. Another expectation is 
that it would improve investor confidence and increase foreign direct investment in Colombia, 
which would bring more economic stability to the country. For Colombia, a free trade agreement 
with the United States is part of the country’s overall development strategy and efforts to promote 
economic growth and stability.  
Review of the Proposed U.S.-Colombia Free Trade 
Agreement 
Key CFTA Provisions5 
The comprehensive free trade agreement would eliminate tariffs and other barriers to goods and 
services. The agreement was reached after numerous rounds of negotiations over a period of 
nearly two years. Some issues that took longer to resolve were related to agriculture. Colombia 
had been seeking lenient agriculture provisions in the agreement, arguing that the effects of 
liberalization on rural regions could have adverse effects on smaller farmers and drive them to 
coca production. The United States agreed to give more sensitive sectors longer phase-out periods 
to allow Colombia more time to adjust to trade liberalization. Sectors receiving the longest phase-
out periods included poultry and rice.6 
This section summarizes several key provisions in the original agreement text as provided by the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR), unless otherwise noted.7 
                                                             
 
4
 For more information, see CRS Report RL34108, U.S.-Peru Economic Relations and the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion 
Agreement, by M. Angeles Villarreal. 
5
 The text of the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) is available online at the Office of the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) website: http://www.ustr.gov. 
6
 Bureau of National Affairs, International Trade Reporter, “Colombia and U.S. Reach FTA after Resolving 
Agriculture Issues,” March 2, 2006. 
7
 USTR, Trade Facts, “Free Trade with Colombia: Summary of the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion 
Agreement,” June 2007. 
The Proposed U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement 
 
Congressional Research Service 4 
Market Access 
The agreement would provide for the elimination of tariffs on bilateral trade in eligible goods. 
Colombia’s average tariff on U.S. goods is 12.5% while the average U.S. tariff on Colombian 
goods is 3%. Colombia applies tariffs in the 0%-5% range on range on capital goods, industrial 
goods, and raw materials; 10% on manufactured goods with some exceptions; and 15% to 20% 
on consumer and “sensitive” goods.8 Upon implementation, the agreement would eliminate 80% 
of duties on U.S. exports of consumer and industrial products to Colombia. An additional 7% of 
U.S. exports would receive duty-free treatment within five years of implementation and most 
remaining tariffs would be eliminated within 10 years after implementation. 
Tariff Elimination and Phase-Outs 
The pending CFTA would eliminate most tariffs immediately upon implementation of the 
agreement and phase out the remaining tariffs over periods of up to 19 years. Tariff elimination 
for major sectors would include the following: 
• Upon implementation of an agreement, more than 99% of U.S. and almost 76% 
of Colombian industrial and textile tariff lines would be free of duty. Virtually all 
industrial and textile tariff lines would be duty-free 10 years after 
implementation.9 
• All tariffs in textiles and apparel that meet the agreement’s rules-of-origin 
provisions would be eliminated immediately (see section on Textiles and Apparel 
below).10 
• Tariffs on agricultural products would be phased out over a period of time, 
ranging from three to 19 years (see section on Agricultural Provisions below). 
Colombia would eliminate quotas11 and over-quota tariffs in 12 years for corn 
and other feed grains, 15 years for dairy products, 18 years for chicken leg 
quarters, and 19 years for rice.12 
Agricultural Provisions 
Under ATPA, almost all of Colombia’s agricultural exports enter the U.S. market free of duty. The 
pending CFTA would make these trade preferences permanent. Colombia currently applies some 
tariff protection on all agricultural products. The pending CFTA would provide duty-free access 
on 77% of all agricultural tariff lines, accounting for 52% of current U.S. exports to Colombia, 
upon implementation. Colombia would eliminate most other tariffs on agricultural products 
                                                             
 
8
 See USTR, 2008 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, March 2008. 
9
 United States International Trade Commission (USITC), U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agrement: Potential 
Economy-wide and Selected Sectoral Effects, USITC Publication 3896, December 2006, pp. 2-1 and 2-2. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Tariff rate quotas are limits on the quantity of imports that can enter a country duty-free before tariff-rates are 
applied. 
12
 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Foreign Agricultural Service, Fact Sheet: U.S.-Colombia Trade 
Promotion Agreement Overall Agriculture Fact Sheet, August 2008. 
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within 15 years.13 U.S. farm exports to Colombia that would receive immediate duty-free 
treatment include high-quality beef, cotton, wheat, soybeans, soybean meal, apples, pears, 
peaches, cherries, and many processed food products including frozen french fries and cookies. 
U.S. farm products that would receive improved market access include pork, beef, corn, poultry, 
rice, fruits and vegetables, processed products, and dairy products. The agreement would also 
provide duty-free tariff rate quotas on standard beef, chicken leg quarters, dairy products, corn, 
sorghum, animal feeds, rice, and soybean oil.14 
Colombia has a “price-band” import duty system on certain agricultural products. Under the price 
band system, variable duties are imposed on top of ad valorem tariffs to keep domestic prices 
within a predetermined range. This system results in higher duties for certain U.S. exports to 
Colombia, including corn, wheat, rice, soybeans, pork, poultry, cheeses, and powdered milk. A 
CFTA would remove Colombia’s price band system upon implementation of the agreement. 
However, if the rates under the price band system result in a lower rate than that given under the 
FTA, the United States will be allowed to sell the product to Colombia at the lower rates.15 
Information Technology 
Under a CFTA, Colombia would join the World Trade Organization’s Information Technology 
Agreement (ITA), and remove its tariff and non-tariff barriers to information technology products. 
Colombia would allow trade in remanufactured goods under the agreement, which would increase 
export and investment opportunities for U.S. businesses involved in remanufactured products 
such as machinery, computers, cellular telephones, and other devices. 
Textiles and Apparel 
In textiles and apparel, products that meet the agreement’s rules of origin requirements would 
receive duty-free and quota-free treatment immediately. The United States and Colombia have 
cooperation commitments under the agreement that would allow for verification of claims of 
origin or preferential treatment, and denial of preferential treatment or entry if the claims cannot 
be verified. The rules of origin requirements are generally based on the yarn-forward standard to 
encourage production and economic integration. A “de minimis” provision would allow limited 
amounts of specified third-country content to go into U.S. and Colombian apparel to provide 
producers in both countries flexibility. A special textile safeguard would provide for temporary 
tariff relief if imports prove to be damaging to domestic producers. 
Government Procurement 
In government procurement contracts, the two countries agreed to grant non-discriminatory rights 
to bid on government contracts. These provisions would cover the purchases of Colombia’s 
ministries and departments, as well as its legislature and courts. U.S. companies would also be 
                                                             
 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 USTR, Trade Facts: Free Trade with Colombia, Summary of the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion 
Agreement,” June 2007. 
15
 USITC Publication 3896, December 2006, p. 3-4. 
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assured access to the purchases of a number of Colombia’s government enterprises, including its 
oil company. 
Services 
In services trade, the two countries agreed to market access in most services sectors, with very 
few exceptions. Colombia agreed to exceed commitments made in the WTO and to remove 
significant services and investment barriers, such as requirements that U.S. firms hire nationals 
rather than U.S. citizens to provide professional services. Colombia also agreed to eliminate 
requirements to establish a branch in order to provide a service and unfair penalties imposed on 
U.S. companies for terminating their relationships with local commercial agents. U.S. financial 
service suppliers would have full rights to establish subsidiaries or branches for banks and 
insurance companies. Portfolio managers would be able to provide portfolio management services 
to both mutual funds and pension funds in the partner country, including to funds that manage 
privatized social security accounts. 
Investment 
Investment provisions would establish a stable legal framework for foreign investors from the 
partner country. All forms of investment would be protected, including enterprises, debt, 
concessions and similar contracts, and intellectual property. U.S. investors would be treated as 
Colombian investors with very few exceptions. U.S. investors in Colombia would have 
substantive and procedural protections that foreign investors have under the U.S. legal system, 
including due process protections and the right to receive fair market value for property in the 
event of an expropriation. Protections for U.S. investments would be backed by a transparent, 
binding international arbitration mechanism. In the preamble of the agreement, the United States 
and Colombia agreed that foreign investors would not be accorded greater substantive rights with 
respect to investment protections than domestic investors under domestic law.16 
IPR Protection 
The agreement would provide intellectual property rights (IPR) protections for U.S. and 
Colombian companies. In all categories of IPR, U.S. companies would be treated no less 
favorably than Colombian companies. In trademark protection the agreement would require the 
two countries to have a system for resolving disputes about trademarks used in internet domain 
names; to develop an on-line system for the registration and maintenance of trademarks and have 
a searchable database; and have transparent procedures for trademark registration. 
In protection of copyrighted works, the agreement has a number of provisions for protection of 
copyrighted works in a digital economy, including provisions that copyright owners would 
maintain rights over temporary copies of their works on computers. Other agreement provisions 
include rights for copyright owners for making their work available on-line; extended terms of 
protection for copyrighted works; requirements for governments to use only legitimate computer 
                                                             
 
16
 USTR, Trade Facts: Free Trade with Colombia, Summary of the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion 
Agreement, June 2007. 
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software; rules on encrypted satellite signals to prevent piracy of satellite television 
programming; and rules for the liability of Internet Service Providers for copyright infringement. 
In protection of patents and trade secrets, U.S. companies are concerned that the Colombian 
government currently does not provide patent protection for new uses of previously known or 
patented products. The pending CFTA would limit the grounds on which a country could revoke a 
patent, thus protecting against arbitrary revocation. In protection of test data and trade secrets, the 
agreement would protect products against unfair commercial use for a period of five years for 
pharmaceuticals and 10 years for agricultural chemicals. In addition, the agreement would require 
the establishment of procedures to prevent marketing of pharmaceutical products that infringe 
patents, and provide protection for newly developed plant varieties. The parties expressed their 
understanding that the intellectual property chapter would not prevent either party from taking 
measures to protect public health by promoting access to medicines for all. 
The United States is concerned with music and motion picture property piracy in Colombia. The 
CFTA IPR provisions would include penalties for piracy and counterfeiting and criminalize end-
user piracy. It would require the parties to authorize the seizure, forfeiture, and destruction of 
counterfeit and pirated goods and the equipment used to produce them. The agreement would 
mandate both statutory and actual damages for copyright infringement and trademark piracy. This 
would ensure that monetary damages could be awarded even if a monetary value to the violation 
was difficult to assess. 
Customs Procedures and Rules of Origin 
The agreement includes comprehensive rules of origin provisions that would ensure that only 
U.S. and Colombian goods could benefit from the agreement. The agreement also includes 
customs procedures provisions, including requirements for transparency and efficiency, 
procedural certainty and fairness, information sharing, and special procedures for the release of 
express delivery shipments. 
Labor Provisions 
The labor and worker rights obligations are included in the core text of the agreement. The United 
States and Colombia reaffirmed their obligations as members of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO). The two countries agreed to adopt, maintain and enforce laws that 
incorporate core internationally recognized labor rights, as stated in the 1998 ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, including a prohibition on the worst forms of child 
labor. The parties also agreed to enforce labor laws with acceptable conditions of work, hours of 
work, and occupational safety and health. All obligations of the CFTA chapter on labor would be 
subject to the same dispute settlement procedures and enforcement mechanisms as other chapters 
of the agreement. 
The agreement includes procedural guarantees to ensure that workers and employers would have 
fair, equitable, and transparent access to labor tribunals or courts. It has a cooperative mechanism 
to promote respect for the principles embodied in the 1998 ILO Declaration, and compliance with 
ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor. The United States and Colombia agreed 
to cooperative activities on laws and practices related to ILO labor standards; the ILO convention 
on the worst forms of child labor; methods to improve labor administration and enforcement of 
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labor laws; social dialogue and alternative dispute resolution; occupational safety and health 
compliance; and mechanisms and best practices on protecting the rights of migrant workers. 
Environmental Provisions 
The environmental obligations are included in the core text of the agreement. The agreement 
would require the United States and Colombia to effectively enforce their own domestic 
environmental laws and to adopt, maintain, and implement laws and all other measures to fulfill 
obligations under covered multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Both countries 
committed to pursue high levels of environmental protection and to not derogate from 
environmental laws in a manner that would weaken or reduce protections. The agreement 
includes procedural guarantees that would ensure fair, equitable, and transparent proceedings for 
the administration and enforcement of environmental laws. In addition, the agreement includes 
provisions to help promote voluntary, market-based mechanisms to protect the environment and 
to ensure that views of civil society are appropriately considered through a public submissions 
process. All obligations in the environmental chapter of the agreement would be subject to the 
same dispute settlement procedures and enforcement mechanisms as obligations in other chapters 
of the agreement. 
Dispute Settlement 
The core obligations of the agreement, including labor and environmental provisions, are subject 
to dispute settlement provisions. The agreement’s provisions on dispute panel proceedings 
include language to help promote openness and transparency through open public hearings; 
public release of legal submissions by parties; and opportunities for interested third parties to 
submit views. The provisions would require the parties to make every attempt, through 
cooperation and consultations, to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of a dispute. If the 
parties are unable to settle the dispute through consultations, the complaining party would have 
the right to request an independent arbitral panel to help resolve the dispute. Possible outcomes 
could include monetary penalties or a suspension of trade benefits. 
Strengthening of Labor and Environmental Provisions 
In early 2007, a number of members of Congress indicated that some of the provisions in pending 
U.S. FTAs would have to be strengthened to gain their approval, particularly relating to core labor 
standards. After several months of negotiation, Congress and the Bush Administration reached an 
agreement on May 10, 2007, on a new bipartisan trade framework that calls for the inclusion of 
core labor and environmental standards in the text of pending and future trade agreements. On 
June 28, 2007, the United States reached an agreement with Colombia on legally binding 
amendments to the CFTA on labor, the environment, and other matters to reflect the bipartisan 
agreement of May 10. 
The amendments to the FTA were based on the agreement reached between the Bush 
Administration and Congress on May 10, 2007, and are similar to the amendments that were 
made to the U.S.-Peru free trade agreement, which was approved by Congress in December 2008. 
At the time they were announced, the Bush Administration stated that, because the new 
commitments would have to be “legally binding”, they could not have been incorporated into the 
agreement as side letters. Some of the key amendments include obligations related to five basic 
ILO labor rights, multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), and pharmaceutical intellectual 
The Proposed U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement 
 
Congressional Research Service 9 
property rights (IPR). These provisions would be fully enforceable through the FTA’s dispute 
settlement mechanism. The Colombian government has approved the amendments. On October 
30, 2007, the Colombian Senate “overwhelmingly” approved the labor and environmental 
amendments to the CFTA, marking the end of the approval process for the agreement in 
Colombia.17 
Amendments on Basic Labor Standards 
After the bipartisan agreement, the Administration reached an agreement with Colombia to 
amend the CFTA to require the parties to “adopt, maintain and enforce in their own laws and in 
practice” the five basic internationally recognized labor standards, as stated in the 1998 ILO 
Declaration. The amendments to the agreement strengthened the earlier labor provisions which 
only required the signatories to strive to ensure that their domestic laws would provide for labor 
standards consistent with internationally recognized labor principles. 
The amendments that resulted from the bipartisan trade framework were intended to enhance the 
protection and promotion of worker rights by including enforceable ILO core labor standards in 
the agreement. These include 1) freedom of association; 2) the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining; 3) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; 4) the 
effective abolition of child labor and a prohibition on the worst forms of child labor; and 5) the 
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. These obligations would 
refer only to the 1998 ILO Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. 
Another change to the agreement relates to labor law enforcement. Any decision made by a 
signatory on the distribution of enforcement resources would not be a reason for not complying 
with the labor provisions. Under the amended provisions, parties would not be allowed to 
derogate from labor obligations in a manner affecting trade or investment. Labor obligations 
would be subject to the same dispute settlement, same enforcement mechanisms, and same 
criteria for selection of enforcement mechanisms as all other obligations in the agreement. 
Provisions on Environment 
In the original text of the agreement, the parties would have been required to “effectively 
enforce” their own domestic environmental laws; this was the only environmental provision that 
would have been enforceable through the agreement’s dispute settlement procedures. Other 
environmental provisions in the original text, that were not enforceable, included provisions on 
environmental cooperation, procedural guarantees for enforcement of environmental laws, and 
provisions for a public submissions process. Under the amended version of the proposed FTA, the 
United States and Colombia agreed to effectively enforce their own domestic environmental laws, 
and to adopt, maintain, and implement laws and all other measures to fulfill obligations under the 
seven covered multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). The amended agreement states 
that all obligations in the environment chapter would be subject to the same dispute settlement 
procedures and enforcement mechanisms as all other obligations in the agreement. 
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Other Provisions 
Other amendments to the proposed FTA include provisions on intellectual property, government 
procurement, and port security. On intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, some members of 
Congress were concerned that the original commitments would have prevented the poor from 
having access to medicines to treat AIDS or other infectious diseases. The amended agreement 
was a way of trying to find a balance between the need for IPR protection for pharmaceutical 
companies to foster innovation and the desire for promoting access to generic medicines to all 
segments of the population. The amended text of the agreement maintains the five years of data 
exclusivity for test data related to pharmaceuticals. However, if Colombia relies on U.S. Federal 
Drug Administration (FDA) approval of a given drug, and meets certain conditions for 
expeditious approval of that drug in Colombia, the data exclusivity period would expire at the 
same time that the exclusivity expired in the United States. This could allow generic medicines to 
enter more quickly into the market in Colombia. 
In government procurement, the amended provisions would allow U.S. state and federal 
governments to condition government contracts on the adherence to the core labor laws in the 
country where the good is produced or the service is performed. Government agencies also would 
be allowed to include environmental protection requirements in their procurements. Concerning 
port security, a new provision would ensure that if a foreign-owned company were to provide 
services at a U.S. port that would raise national security concerns, the CFTA would not be an 
impediment for U.S. authorities in taking actions to address those concerns.18 
U.S.-Colombia Economic Relations 
With a population of 46 million people, Colombia is the third-most populous country in Latin 
America, after Brazil and Mexico. Colombia’s economy, the fifth-largest economy in Latin 
America, is quite small when compared to that of the United States. Colombia’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) in 2009 was $235 billion, about 1.6% of U.S. GDP of $14.3 trillion in 2009 (see 
Table 1). Colombia’s exports accounted for 17% of GDP in 2009, while imports accounted for 
19%.  
The United States is the Colombia’s dominant trading partner for both Colombia’s imports and 
exports. Subsequently, any change in U.S. demand for Colombian products could have a 
noticeable effect on Colombia’s economy. In 2009, the United States accounted for 28.7% of 
Colombia’s imports and 39.2% of Colombia’s exports. China is the second-leading supplier of 
Colombia’s imports, after the United States, accounting for 11.3% of total imports, followed by 
Mexico, which accounted for 7.0% of Colombia’s imports in 2009. Venezuela is Colombia’s 
second largest export market with a 12.3% export share, followed by the Netherlands with a 4.1% 
export share. Colombia is part of the Andean Community (CAN), a customs union consisting of 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Colombia also has free trade agreements with Chile and 
Mexico. Colombia and Canada concluded a comprehensive free trade agreement in 2009. The 
agreement was approved by both countries in 2010 and is awaiting implementation.  
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Table 1. Key Economic Indicators for Colombia and the United States 
Colombia United States 
 1999 2009a 1999 2009a 
Population (millions) 40 46 279 307 
Nominal GDP ($US billions)b 97 235 9,354 14,258 
GDP, PPPc Basis ($US billions) 212 403 9,354 14,258 
Per Capita GDP ($US) 2,449 5,080 33,520 46,480 
Per Capita GDP in $PPPc 5,333 8,690 33,520 46,480 
Total Merchandise Exports (US$ 
billions) 
12 33 696 1,057 
Exports as % of GDPd 15% 17% 11% 11% 
Total Merchandise Imports (US$ 
billions) 
11 33 1,025 1,558 
Imports as % of GDPd 17% 19% 13% 14% 
Source: Compiled by CRS based on data from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) on-line database. 
a. Some figures for 2009 are estimates.  
b. Nominal GDP is calculated by EIU based on figures from World Bank and World Development Indicators.  
c. PPP refers to purchasing power parity, which attempts to factor in price differences across countries when 
estimating the size of a foreign economy in U.S. dollars.  
d. Exports and Imports as % of GDP are derived by the EIU and include trade in both goods and services.  
 
U.S.-Colombia Merchandise Trade 
The United States is Colombia’s leading trade partner. In 2009, 39% of Colombia’s exports went 
to the United States, compared to 37% in 2008 and 34% in 2007. Twenty-nine percent of 
Colombia’s imports were supplied by the United States in 2009, the same as in 2008 but slightly 
higher than the 2007 figure of 27%. Venezuela is Colombia’s second-most significant trade 
partner, accounting for 12% of Colombia’s exports and 3% of Colombia’s imports. Other major 
trade partners for Colombia are China, Mexico, and Brazil. 
Colombia accounts for a very small percentage of U.S. trade (0.8% in 2009). Colombia ranks 22nd 
among U.S. export markets and 27th in the world as a source of U.S. imports. U.S. exports to 
Colombia totaled $8.8 billion in 2009, while U.S. imports totaled $11.2 billion. As shown in 
Table 2, the dominant U.S. import item from Colombia is crude oil (43% of U.S. imports from 
Colombia in 2009), followed by coal (10% of total), and gold (9% of total). The leading U.S. 
export items are petroleum oils, other than crude, (14% of U.S. exports to Colombia in 2009), 
machinery parts (4% of total), and corn (3% of total). 
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Table 2. U.S. Trade with Colombia, 2009 
U.S. Exports U.S. Imports 
Leading Items 
 (HTS 4 Digit 
Level) $ Millions Sharea 
Leading Items
(HTS 4 Digit 
Level) $ Millions Sharea 
Petroleum oils 
and oils from 
bituminous 
minerals (other 
than crude) and 
products 
1,187.6 14% Crude 
petroleum oils 
and oils from 
bituminous 
minerals 
4,812.6 43% 
Machinery parts 
for trucks, 
bulldozers, 
snowplows, etc. 
364.0 4% Coal and coal 
products 
1,079.0 10% 
Corn (maize) 219.4 3% Gold 1,026.8 9% 
Self-propelled 
bulldozers and 
related products 
204.8 2% Coffee and 
coffee products 
716.1 6% 
Aircraft, 
spacecraft, and 
parts 
199.6 2% Cut flowers and 
buds 
506.7 5% 
All Other 6,576.7 75% All Other 3,068.2 27% 
Total Exports 8,752.1 — Total Imports 11,209.4 — 
Source: Compiled by CRS using USITC Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb at http://dataweb.usitc.gov: HTS 
4-digit level. 
a. Totals may not add up due to rounding.  
 
After increasing from $6.3 billion in 2003 to $13.1 billion in 2008, U.S. imports from Colombia 
decreased to $11.2 billion in 2009. U.S. exports to Colombia also decreased in 2009 to $8.8 
billion. Exports to Colombia had increased from $3.5 billion in 2003 to $10.6 billion in 2008 (see 
Figure 1). In the five-year period prior to 2003, both U.S. imports from and exports to Colombia 
had gone through some fluctuations, without significant changes.  
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Figure 1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Colombia 
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Source: Compiled by CRS using USITC Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb at http://dataweb.usitc.gov. 
 
Andean Trade Preference Act 
The United States currently extends duty-free treatment to imports from Colombia under the 
Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), a regional trade preference program.19 ATPA was enacted 
on December 4, 1991 (Title II of P.L. 102-182), and was renewed and modified under the Andean 
Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA; Title XXXI of P.L. 107-210) on August 6, 
2002. Additional products receiving preferential duty treatment under ATPDEA include certain 
items in the following categories: petroleum and petroleum products, textiles and apparel 
products, footwear, tuna in flexible containers, and others. Since the enactment of ATPDEA, 
Congress has extended ATPA preferences several times for Colombia and other Andean countries 
for short periods of time. The most recent extension of ATPA (P.L. 111-344) extended preferences 
for Colombia and Ecuador until February 12, 2011.  
ATPA, as amended by ATPDEA, is part of a broader U.S. initiative with Andean countries to 
address the drug trade problem with Latin America. It authorized the President to grant duty-free 
treatment or reduced tariffs to certain products from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, or Peru that met 
domestic content and other requirements. The act (as a complement to crop eradication, 
interdiction, military training, and other counter-narcotics efforts) is intended to promote 
economic growth in the Andean region and to encourage a shift away from dependence on illegal 
drugs by supporting legitimate economic activities. Increased access to the U.S. market is 
expected to help create jobs and expand legitimate opportunities for workers in the Andean 
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countries in alternative export sectors. Bolivia’s designation as a beneficiary country ended in 
December 2008 because it failed to meet the eligibility criteria, and Peru is no longer a 
beneficiary country because it has entered into a free trade agreement with the United States. 
Table 3. U.S. Imports from Colombia 
($ Millions) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total Imports 6,346.2 7,360.6 8,770.3 9,239.8 9,251.2 13,058.8 11,209.4 
All Duty-Free 4,109.2 6557.8 7,892.5 8,531.5 8,447.1 12,044.1 9,962.9 
% of Total 65% 89% 90% 92% 91% 92% 89% 
ATPAa 2,908.7 3,888.9 4,653.2 4,791.2 4,527.7 7,339.2 5,589.5 
% of Total 46% 53% 53% 52% 49% 56% 50% 
Source: Compiled by CRS using USITC data. 
a. Includes imports under ATPA and ATPDEA. 
 
Almost 90% of U.S. imports from Colombia receive duty-free treatment through preference 
programs or normal trade relations (see Table 3). In 2009, 50% of total U.S. imports from 
Colombia received preferential duty treatment under ATPA. Of those, the leading imports were 
crude oil, cut flowers and buds, petroleum oil products (other than crude), and men’s woven 
apparel. The trade preference program contributed to a rapid increase in ATPA imports from 
Colombia. Between 2003 and 2008, total imports from Colombia increased by 106%, while ATPA 
imports from Colombia increased by 153%. The rapid increase in import value was partially due 
to an increase in the volume of imports caused by the trade preferences act, but rising prices of 
mineral and energy-related imports were also a major factor. Imports in 2009 declined, however, 
as a result of the global financial crisis, with total imports from Colombia decreasing from $13.1 
billion to $11.2 billion (14%) and ATPA imports decreasing from $7.3 billion to $5.6 billion 
(24%) between 2008 and 2009. Crude oil and petroleum oil products accounted for 77% of ATPA 
imports from Colombia in 2009 (see Table 4). 
Table 4. U.S. Imports from Colombia under ATPA 
($ Millions) 
Import Itema 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Crude Oil 1,692.9 2,299.7 2,897.1 3,183.7 3,152.6 5,813.9 4,318.2 
Cut Flowers and Buds 343.1 414.4 417.5 448.1 506.3 498.6 505.9 
Oil and Products  
(other than crude) 
321.2 405.5 454.6 202.5 141.2 375.3 249.0 
Men’s Apparel 89.9 147.9 211.9 182.0 139.6 128.6 67.4 
Total ATPAb  2,908.7 3,888.9 4,653.2 4,791.2 4,527.7 7,339.2 5,589.5 
Source: Compiled by CRS using USITC data. 
a. HTS 4-digt level. 
b. Includes imports under ATPA and ATPDEA.  
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U.S.-Colombia Bilateral Foreign Direct Investment 
U.S. foreign direct investment in Colombia on a historical-cost basis totaled $6.7 billion in 2009 
(see Table 5). The largest amount was in mining, which accounted for 46.9%, or $3.2 billion, of 
total U.S. FDI in Colombia in 2009. The second-largest amount, $1.7 billion (25.0% of total), was 
in manufacturing, followed by $485 million in wholesale trade. 
 
Table 5. U.S. Direct Investment Position in Colombia 
(Historical-Cost Basis: 2009) 
Industry Amount  
(U.S.$ Millions) 
% of Total 
Mining 3,153 46.9% 
Manufacturing  1,683 25.0% 
Finance and 
Insurancea 
485 7.2% 
Total 6,728  
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Economic Accounts. 
a. Except depository institutions.  
 
The proposed U.S.-Colombia FTA is expected to improve investor confidence in Colombia and 
would likely increase the amount of U.S. FDI in the country. Investors from other countries 
would also be expected to increase investment in Colombia as the FDI environment improves. 
According to one study, FDI in Colombia would have increased by more than $2 billion from 
2007 through 2010 had the proposed CFTA been implemented in 2007.20 
Background on Colombia21 
Colombia is a democratic nation with a bicameral legislature. In spite of its democratic tradition, 
Colombia has suffered from internal conflict for over 40 years. This conflict and drug violence 
present unique challenges to Colombia’s institutions and threaten the human rights of Colombian 
citizens. In 2002, an independent candidate, Alvaro Uribe, won the 2002 presidential elections, 
largely because of his aggressive plan to reduce violence in Colombia. President Uribe, who 
served two terms in office, retained widespread support throughout his presidency. His popularity 
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derived from the progress his government made in improving the security situation in Colombia; 
pursuing foreign policy objectives; and opening up foreign trade markets. Colombia continues to 
face serious challenges despite the progress it has made in recent years.  
Presidential Elections in 2010 
In the presidential election of June 2010, Juan Manuel Santos of the Partido de Unidad Nacional 
(Partido de la U) was elected president of Colombia with 69% of the vote. President Santos 
previously served as defense minister (2006-2009) under former President Alvaro Uribe and in 
two prior governments as finance minister and minister of trade. Santos was sworn into office on 
August 7, 2010, under an optimistic mood in the country, but the new government has significant 
foreign policy and domestic challenges ahead. The country’s main foreign policy challenges will 
be to improve relations with Venezuela and Ecuador. In addition, President Santos is planning to 
move forward with a series of reforms involving oil and mining royalties, healthcare, the justice 
system, and land.22 On September 9, 2010, President Santos unveiled a new ambitious trade 
strategy aimed at increasing the value of Colombian exports by improving competitiveness, 
increasing market access to new markets, and providing more government support. The new 
strategy reflects President Santos’ support of the pending U.S.-Colombia FTA and his desire to 
complete FTA negotiations with a number of countries.23 
Violence in Colombia 
Colombia has a long tradition of civilian, democratic rule, yet has been plagued by violence 
throughout its history. The three major armed groups today are the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forces 
of Colombia (AUC). Although the AUC disbanded in 2006, it remains a designated foreign 
terrorist organization. The Colombian government has made significant achievements against 
terrorist leadership targets in Colombia. A 2009 report by the State Department states that 
Colombia has maintained and strengthened its “Democratic Security” strategy, which combines 
military, intelligence, police operations, and efforts to demobilize combatants. It also provides 
public services in rural areas previously dominated by armed groups. Kidnappings in Colombia 
by criminal groups significantly decreased in 2008.24 The threat of extradition to the United States 
has been a strong weapon against drug traffickers and terrorists. In 2008, Colombia extradited a 
record 208 defendants to the United States for prosecution, most of which were Colombian 
nationals.25 
Violence in Colombia has its roots in a lack of state control over much of Colombian territory, 
and a long history of poverty and inequality. The shift of cocaine production from Peru and 
Bolivia to Colombia in the 1980s increased drug violence, and provided a source of revenue for 
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both guerrillas and paramilitaries. Conflicts between the Conservative and Liberal parties have 
existed for more than 100 years and have killed hundreds of thousands of Colombians. While a 
power-sharing agreement between the Liberal and Conservative parties ended a civil war in 1957, 
it did not address the root causes of the violence. Numerous leftist guerrilla groups inspired by the 
Cuban Revolution formed in the 1960s as a response to state neglect and poverty. Rightwing 
paramilitaries were formed in the 1980s to defend landowners, many of them drug traffickers, 
against guerrillas. Most of the rightist paramilitary groups were coordinated by the AUC, which 
disbanded in 2006 after more than 30,000 of its members demobilized. The AUC has been 
accused of gross human rights abuses and collusion with the Colombian Armed Forces in their 
fight against the FARC and ELN. The AUC also participated in narcotics trafficking.  
Human Rights Issues 
The debate on U.S. policy toward Colombia and on the proposed free trade agreement with 
Colombia has brought attention to allegations of human rights abuses by the FARC and ELN, 
paramilitary groups, and the Colombian Armed Forces. The State Department’s February 2010 
human rights report states that the Prosecutor General’s Office in Colombia has been assigned 
1,302 cases concerning extrajudicial killings by the armed forces allegedly taking place between 
1985 and 2009.26 Progress in addressing the backlog of cases concerning extrajudicial killings has 
proceeded slowly.  
Congress has annually required that the Secretary of State certify to Congress that the Colombian 
military and policy forces are severing their links to the paramilitaries, investigating complaints 
of abuses, and prosecuting those who have had credible charges made against them. In the 
September 2010 report, the State Department determined and certified to Congress that the 
Colombian government and armed forces are meeting statutory criteria related to human rights. 
The report states that though there continues to be a need for improvement, the Colombian 
government has taken positive steps to improve respect for human rights in the country. 
According to the report, the Colombian government’s firm resolve on not tolerating extrajudicial 
killings has led to a rapid reversal in this trend. The report also acknowledges the significant steps 
that the Santos Administration has taken to demonstrate it is taking human rights seriously and its 
actions on a the establishment of a roundtable on labor, meetings with NGOs and civil society 
groups, increasing engagement with these groups, and outreach to Colombia’s courts to repair 
relations with the judicial system.27 
Relations between the Uribe Administration and human rights organizations were often tense 
because of the groups’ doubts about President Uribe’s commitment to human rights. There was 
some speculation that President Uribe would not renew the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (UNHCHR) mandate in 2006. However, President Uribe extended the 
UNHCHR’s mandate until October 30, 2010. The UNHCHR has criticized the paramilitary 
demobilization process and the government, along with paramilitaries and leftist guerrillas, for 
human rights violations. 
                                                             
 
26
 U.S. Department of State, 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Colombia, March 11, 2010.  
27
 U.S. State Department, Office of the Spokesman, Determination and Certification of the Colombian Government and 
Armed Forces with Respect to Human Rights Related Conditions, September 15, 2010. 
The Proposed U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement 
 
Congressional Research Service 18 
The March 2010 UNHCHR report credited the Colombian government with making significant 
progress in the situation regarding human rights and international humanitarian law in Colombia. 
The UNHCHR acknowledged the significant progress the government has made in the drastic 
reduction in the number of complaints of extra-judicial executions and prosecutions of 
government officials for alleged links with paramilitary organizations. The report recognized the 
government’s openness to international scrutiny with regard to human rights issues in Colombia. 
The report also acknowledged the spirit of cooperation between the Colombian government and 
UNHCHR-Colombia, and the commitment of the government to address human rights 
challenges.28 As in previous reports, UNHCHR expressed concerns about the activities and 
abuses committed by paramilitary forces that have rearmed, and by the FARC. The report 
described the continued vulnerability of groups like women, children, Afro-Colombians, the 
indigenous, journalists, union leaders, and human rights workers.29 
U.S. Policy Toward Colombia 
The focus of U.S. foreign policy toward Colombia has been to curb narcotics production and 
trafficking. The United States also seeks to promote democracy and economic development in 
order to strengthen regional security. Colombia’s spacious, rugged and sparsely populated 
territory provides ample isolated terrain for drug cultivation and processing, and contributes to the 
government’s difficulties in exerting control throughout the nation. The country is known for a 
long tradition of democracy but has had to contend with continuing violence from leftist guerrilla 
insurgencies dating from the 1960s and persistent drug trafficking activity. Plan Colombia, a 
multi-year effort to address Colombia’s key challenges, has been the centerpiece of U.S. policy 
toward Colombia since 2000. 
The United States has made a significant commitment of funds and material support to help 
Colombia and the Andean region fight drug trafficking since the development of Plan Colombia 
in 1999. In support of the plan, Congress passed legislation providing $1.3 billion in assistance 
for FY2000 (P.L. 106-246) and has provided more than $7 billion to support Plan Colombia from 
FY2000 through FY2010 in both State Department and Defense Department accounts. Since 
2002, Congress has granted the State Department expanded authority to use counternarcotics 
funds for a unified campaign to fight both drug trafficking and terrorist organizations in 
Colombia. In 2004, Congress raised the statutory cap on U.S. personnel allowed to be deployed to 
Colombia in support of Plan Colombia. The three main illegally armed groups in Colombia 
participate in drug production and trafficking and have been designated foreign terrorist 
organizations by the State Department. 
In 2008, there was significant debate in Congress about the proper balance between so-called 
“hard-side” security assistance (i.e., equipment and training to the Colombian military and police) 
and “soft-side” traditional development and rule of law programs. Some members supported the 
emphasis on security-related assistance to Colombia, while others expressed a desire to see more 
emphasis on economic and social aid in the annual foreign assistance appropriations legislation. 
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Since 2008, Congress has reduced and rebalanced assistance between development assistance and 
security and counterdrug assistance.30  
The Proposed CFTA: Issues for Congress 
Economic Impact 
If and when fully implemented, the U.S.-Colombia FTA would likely have a have a small, but 
positive, net economic effect on the United States. Colombia’s economy is small compared to the 
U.S. economy (1.6%) and the value of U.S. trade with Colombia is a very small percentage of 
overall U.S. trade. Most of the economy-wide trade effects of trade liberalization from the FTA 
would arise from Colombia’s removal of tariff barriers and other trade restrictions. 
Approximately 90% of U.S. imports from Colombia enter the United States duty-free, either 
unconditionally or under the ATPA or other U.S. provisions; hence, the marginal effects of the 
FTA on the U.S. economy likely would not be significant. 
Study Findings 
A study by the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) assessed the potential 
effects of a U.S.-Colombia FTA on the U.S. economy. The study found that, in general, the 
primary impact of an FTA with Colombia would be increased U.S. exports to Colombia as a 
result of enhanced U.S. access to the Colombian market.31 Major findings of the USITC study on 
the likely effects of a U.S.-Colombia FTA on the U.S. economy, should the agreement be fully 
implemented, include the following:32 
• U.S. exports to Colombia would increase by $1.1 billion (13.7%) and U.S. 
imports from Colombia would increase by $487 million (5.5%). U.S. GDP would 
increase by over $2.5 billion (less than 0.05%). 
• The largest estimated increases in U.S. exports to Colombia, by value, would be 
in chemical, rubber, and plastic products; machinery and equipment; and motor 
vehicles and parts. In terms of percentage increases, the largest increases in U.S. 
exports would be in rice and dairy products. 
• The largest estimated increases in U.S. imports from Colombia, by value, would 
be in sugar and crops not elsewhere classified. The largest estimated increases in 
U.S. imports, by percent, would be in dairy products and sugar. 
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• On an industry level, the FTA would result in minimal to no effect on output or 
employment for most sectors of the U.S. economy. The U.S. sugar sector would 
be the only sector with an estimated decline of more than 0.1% in output or 
employment. The largest increases in U.S. output and employment would be in 
the processed rice, cereal grains, and wheat sectors. 
The USITC reviewed seven studies that it found on the probable economic effects of a U.S.-
Colombia FTA.33 The results of the studies reviewed by USITC varied. One study found that U.S. 
exports to Colombia would increase by 2.4% to 8.3%, while another study assessed that the 
expected increase would be 44%. Two studies found that the largest increases in U.S. exports 
would be in agriculture products, metal and wood, and food products. In assessing the impact on 
U.S. imports from Colombia, the results of the studies also varied. One study found that U.S. 
imports from Colombia would increase by 2.0% to 6.2%, while another found that U.S. imports 
would increase by 37%. The largest increases would be in apparel and leather goods, textile 
products, and metal and wood. The studies also assessed that an FTA would result in small overall 
welfare gains for both the United States and Colombia and a positive impact on the U.S. 
agricultural sector despite an increase in U.S. sugar imports.34 
The non-governmental Institute for International Economics (IIE) also has a study assessing the 
possible impact of a U.S.-Colombia FTA on both the U.S. and Colombian economies.35 The study 
found that the proposed U.S.-Colombia FTA would be expected to result in an increase in total 
trade between the two countries. The total value of U.S. imports from Colombia would increase 
by an estimated 37% while the value of U.S. exports to Colombia would increase by an estimated 
44%.36 In terms of welfare gains, the study assessed that a U.S.-Colombia FTA would result in 
small welfare benefits for both partners, though the gains would be larger for Colombia. On a 
sectoral level, the study found that an agreement would have a minor sectoral effect on the U.S. 
economy, but the effect would be more significant for Colombia because it is the smaller partner. 
The study indicated that Colombia would face certain structural adjustment issues with a 
displacement of low-skilled workers in some sectors, but that these workers would all be able to 
find job possibilities in the expanding sectors.37 
One of the drawbacks to a bilateral free trade agreement is that it may result in trade diversion 
because it is not fully inclusive of all regional trading partners.38 Trade diversion results when a 
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country enters into an FTA and then shifts the purchase of goods or services (imports) from a 
country that is not an FTA partner to a country that is an FTA partner even though it may be a 
higher cost producer. In the case of the United States and Colombia, for example, goods from the 
United States may replace Colombia’s lower-priced imports from other countries in Latin 
America. If this were to happen, the United States would now be the producer of that item, not 
because it produces the good more efficiently, but because it is receiving preferential access to the 
Colombian market. The IIE study assessed that a CFTA probably would not cause trade diversion 
in the United States, but that it could cause some trade diversion in Colombia. The IIE study 
estimated that an FTA with the United States would result in a decrease in Colombia’s imports 
from other countries of approximately 9%.39 
Agricultural Sector 
The USITC study found that one of the impacts of a U.S.-Colombia FTA would be increased U.S. 
agriculture exports to Colombia as a result of enhanced U.S. access to the Colombian market.40 In 
the agricultural sector, key findings of the study include the following: 
• The removal of tariff and nontariff barriers would likely result in a higher level of 
U.S. exports of meat (beef and pork) to Colombia. U.S. imports of meat from 
Colombia would eventually increase, but are currently restricted by Colombia’s 
lack of certification to export fresh, chilled, or frozen beef or pork to the United 
States. 
• Colombia’s elimination of trade barriers and certain government support 
measures under a CFTA would likely result in increased U.S. grain exports to 
Colombia. Rice would account for most of the increase, with yellow corn and 
wheat accounting for the remaining balance. 
• U.S. exports to Colombia in soybeans, soybean products, and animal feeds would 
likely increase under a CFTA.41 
According to the IIE study, the main gains to Colombia in agricultural trade would likely be more 
secure and preferential market access to the U.S. market. U.S. agricultural exports would gain a 
small but not insignificant preference in the Colombian market for temperate-zone agricultural 
produce. The study’s authors state that the long time periods for phasing out tariffs for sensitive 
products and safeguard provisions that would replace Colombia’s price band system would lessen 
the impact of increased imports from the United States. One section of the study describes the 
results of a global applied general equilibrium model on the pending FTA. In terms of the overall 
effects on Colombia’s economy, the results of the study imply that, in the medium term, 
Colombia would lose a net amount of $63 million, or about 0.06% of GDP. In the longer term, 
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however, Colombia would gain $550 million each year, or about a 0.5% permanent increase to 
GDP.42 
Labor Issues 
The proposed CFTA includes the new trade-labor policy priorities that were established under the 
May 10, 2007, “New Trade Policy for America” that was negotiated and agreed upon by 
Congress and the Bush Administration. This agreement incorporated key Democratic priorities 
relating to labor and other issues on U.S. trade policy. Key concepts in the new trade-labor policy 
include fully enforceable provisions that (1) incorporate ILO core labor standards as stated in the 
1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (henceforth referred to as 
the ILO Declaration);43 and (2) prohibit partner countries from weakening laws relating to ILO 
core labor standards in order to attract trade or investment. 
A number of U.S. labor groups oppose the idea of a free trade agreement with Colombia. They 
maintain that Colombia’s labor movement is under attack through violence, intimidation, and 
harassment, as well as legal channels. In a letter to Congress opposing the U.S.-Colombia FTA, a 
number of trade unions voiced their concern about the violence against Colombian trade 
unionists.44 The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-
CIO) is opposed to the agreement and has issued statements saying that Colombian labor union 
members face daily legal challenges to their rights to organize and bargain collectively and that 
these challenges threaten the existence of the Colombian labor movement. While the AFL-CIO 
acknowledges that Colombia has made progress in protecting union members, it continues to 
have concerns regarding the government’s commitment to protect fundamental worker rights.45 
The official position of Colombian labor unions on the U.S.-Colombia FTA is in opposition to the 
agreement, but the feelings among labor unionists are mixed. In May 2007, 17 Colombian 
unionists representing the textiles, flower, mining, and other Colombian industries visited the 
U.S. Congress to speak out in favor of the agreement. Their main argument was that an FTA 
would provide jobs for Colombia. However, another group of Colombian unions, consisting 
mostly of government employees, have spoken out against the agreement, saying a CFTA would 
interfere with the Colombian government’s right to govern the country, and would have a 
negative effect on Colombia’s agriculture sector and the economy in general.46 
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In November 2007, a high-level delegation from the ILO visited Colombia to assess the progress 
being made there toward protecting workers’ rights. It was the first ILO-initiated mission to 
Colombia since June 2006 when the Colombian government and representatives of Colombia’s 
main employer and worker organizations signed the so-called Tripartite Agreement on Freedom 
of Association and Democracy, which is aimed at securing the fundamental rights of workers. 
Some observers viewed the ILO mission as a possible decision-making factor for some members 
of Congress who were concerned about the worker rights situation in Colombia.47 Following the 
mission, the ILO Governing Body reviewed the Tripartite Agreement and “acknowledged that 
there had been progress in social dialogue and freedom of association in the country due to the 
Tripartite Agreement”, but also added that the situation needed improvement.48 In the ILO’s 2010 
Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(CEACR), it expressed satisfaction regarding the measures the Colombian government had taken 
in improving protection of freedom of association and collective bargaining.49 The 2010 ILO 
report on the application of labor standards removed Colombia from the 25 countries it examined 
for failure to comply with international labor standards. However, the report noted that Colombia 
was taken off the list after a lengthy debate and that it had been taken off the list so as to break a 
gridlock in that particular year.50 
In response to U.S. concerns regarding worker rights in Colombia, the Embassy of Colombia in 
the United States has been reporting the progress that Colombia has made since 2001 in 
strengthening the rights, benefits, and security of unions in Colombia. According to progress 
reports issued by the embassy, government reforms in Colombia since 2002 have helped protect 
Colombian worker rights to form unions, bargain collectively, and strike. These include enhanced 
efforts to open dialogue with union members, including meetings with the President and Vice 
President of Colombia.51 The 2010 report issued by the embassy provides data indicating that 
homicides dropped by 45% between 2002 and 2009. It also states that a protection program aimed 
at vulnerable groups, including union members, and the creation of the special unit at the 
Prosecutor General’s Office have led to an 86% reduction in the level of homicides of union 
members. The report acknowledges that any homicide is one too many, but also states that it is 
important to recognize that Colombia has made significant process in protecting labor and human 
rights.52 
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Violence Issues 
A number of members of Congress oppose the FTA with Colombia because of concerns about 
violence against union members and other terrorist activity in Colombia. In a press release issued 
in 2007, the House leadership issued a statement regarding the concerns regarding the “violence 
in Colombia, the impunity, the lack of investigations and prosecutions, and the role of the 
paramilitary.” The House members stated that there must be “concrete evidence of sustained 
results on the ground in Colombia” before they could support the FTA. In June 2007, several 
Democratic House members said that the high rate of violence against trade unionists in 
Colombia, made Colombia an “unfit free trade agreement partner for the United States.”53 
Republican and some Democratic supporters of the FTA take issue with these charges, stating that 
Colombia has made progress in recent years to curb the violence in the country. Certain members 
have stated that Colombia is a crucial ally of the United States in Latin America and that if the 
FTA with Colombia is not passed, it may lead to further problems in the region. In a report issued 
by USTR, a number of quotes by members of Congress in support of a trade agreement with 
Colombia were compiled. They were generally quoted as saying that the agreement had 
implications for the economic and security interests of the United States in Colombia and that 
Colombia had made significant progress in cutting down on the number of murders and other 
criminal activities.54 
The Bush Administration took the position that Colombia had made significant advances to 
combat violence and instability under the Uribe Administration. A March 2008 fact sheet issued 
by the Press Secretary of the White House stated that President Uribe “responded decisively to 
concerns over the situation in Colombia that have been raised by some members of Congress.”55 
The fact sheet stated that President Uribe had demobilized tens of thousands of members of 
paramilitary fighters; established an independent prosecutor’s unit; created a special program to 
protect labor activists; and revised the pending FTA to include more rigorous labor protections. 
The fact sheet also stated that under President Uribe’s leadership, Colombia had been a “strong 
and capable partner in fighting drugs, crime, and terror.”56 
President Uribe acknowledged that, while there continued to be killings in Colombia, the 
situation had improved under his administration and the Colombian government had been quite 
successful in reducing violence through the justice and peace process. Government reports 
indicate that over 50,000 guerrilla members have been demobilized as a result of the 
government’s recovery of control over territory and the implementation of a peace process with 
paramilitary groups. In addition, the reports state that confessions obtained from former 
paramilitaries and guerillas have provided important information in the investigation of past 
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violence, including that against union members.57 Data provided by the Colombian government 
indicate that assassinations of labor union activists and teachers decreased by 86% between 2001 
and 2009, from 205 in 2001 to 28 in 2008. Total homicides in Colombia decreased from 26,540 in 
2001 to 15,817 in 2009 (a 68% decrease). Homicides of labor union members account for a very 
small percentage of total homicides in Colombia: 0.2% of total homicides in 2009.58  
Regarding the impunity issue, the Uribe Administration made significant efforts to reform its 
judicial system and increase transparency. In 2004, constitutional reforms to the judicial system 
were approved and, in 2007, an “accusatory” system replaced the inquisitorial system.59 
According to the Colombian government, resources for both the judicial branch and the Office of 
the Prosecutor General have increased annually since 2002. In 2008, the government estimated a 
75% increase in funding. The government reported that prosecutions had increased considerably 
between 2001 and 2009, from virtually none in 2001 to 84 convictions and 69 sentences in 
2009.60 
There is a lack of evidence regarding whether or not labor activists were killed because of their 
union activity. Very few investigations have been completed—of the 470 union murders that 
occurred between 2002, when President Uribe first took office, and 2007, 97% remain unsolved. 
In January 2007, the Colombian Attorney General’s Office set up a new special labor unit of 13 
prosecutors and 78 investigators to investigate 187 priority cases.61 According to the State 
Department’s human rights report covering 2009, the Colombian Prosecutor General’s office has 
obtained 234 convictions (209 for murders) of 334 perpetrators of violent crimes against trade 
unionists since 2000. However, a vast majority of the cases are either under investigation or in 
preliminary phases of the prosecutorial process.62 
Outlook 
In his 2011 State of the Union address, President Barack Obama mentioned the importance of 
strengthening U.S. trade relations with Colombia, Panama and South Korea. The Obama 
Administration made a case for pursuing FTAs as part of the 2010 National Security Strategy of 
the United States, but did not specifically mention Colombia in the report.63 Earlier in 2010, 
Michael Froman, Deputy National Security Adviser for International Economic Affairs and 
Deputy Assistant to the President had suggested that the administration would make a case for 
moving the pending FTA with Colombia as part of the national security agenda, at the appropriate 
time.64 The Bush Administration made the argument that the U.S.-Colombia FTA was a national 
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security issue. It stated that passage of an agreement “would bring increased economic 
opportunity to the people of Colombia through sustained economic growth, new employment 
opportunities, and increased investment.”65 It also stated that an FTA would “reinforce democracy 
by fighting corruption, increasing transparency, and fostering accountability and the rule of 
law.”66 
The debate surrounding the pending U.S.-Colombia FTA has mostly centered on the violence 
issues in Colombia. Many proponents of the agreement see it as having important political 
implications for Colombia and U.S. interests in the region. They believe that an FTA with 
Colombia would go beyond the U.S.-Colombia economic relationship because it would be 
viewed by other Latin American nations as indicative of how the United States views its 
relationship with the region. Some members of Congress who have voiced support for the 
agreement believe that the United States needs to support its ally in the region and that if 
Congress does not pass the trade agreement, it could be used by Venezuela or Ecuador to turn 
Colombia against the United States. 
The leaders of several countries in Latin America have voiced support for the pending free trade 
agreements with Colombia and Panama, stating that the passage of these agreements would bring 
economic benefits to these countries and improve the overall U.S. relationship with Latin 
America.67 In contrast, the President of Venezuela has criticized FTAs with the United States and 
has launched his own idea for trade policy through a socially oriented trade block that would 
include mechanisms for poverty reduction.68 
In the United States, opponents of an agreement with Colombia argue that passing an FTA would 
be rewarding the government for its shortcomings in its struggle against drug trafficking, illegally 
armed groups, protecting worker rights, and the history of violence in the country. Some argue 
that the pending agreement would increase drug production and violence in the country and that it 
could increase Colombia’s ongoing civil conflict because it would result in rural displacement. 
They argue that trade liberalization would drive down the prices of agricultural products in 
Colombia and put many farmers out of business.69 They maintain that small farmers would have 
no choice but to migrate to urban areas, work in the drug cultivation zones, or affiliate with 
illegally armed groups.70 Some opponents of a CFTA believe that trade agreements have negative 
socioeconomic impacts. They argue that agreements such as NAFTA and CAFTA-DR, upon 
which the CFTA is based, are failed models and have jeopardized the environment, undermined 
worker rights, and caused job losses in the United States. 
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Much of the U.S. business community supports a free trade agreement with Colombia. They view 
the pending agreement as a big opportunity for U.S. businesses and for exports of U.S. 
agricultural products. The National Pork Producers Council, for example, argues that a trade 
agreement would provide significant new export opportunities for U.S. pork producers and is 
leading a coalition of U.S. agricultural organizations in support of the trade agreement.71 The 
business community often states that an FTA with Colombia would “level the playing field” with 
Colombia by providing U.S. producers of goods and services the same access to the Colombian 
market that Colombian businesses currently have in the U.S. market. They also believe that a 
trade agreement would give U.S. businesses a competitive edge in Colombia over other foreign-
owned businesses. A U.S. Chamber of Commerce representative said that an agreement would 
help Colombia fight narco-trafficking and violence “by developing sustainable economic 
alternatives to the drug trade.”72 
U.S. exporters have urged congressional leaders and the Obama Administration to resolve issues 
that are preventing the stalled free trade agreements with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea 
from being implemented. In a July 2010 letter to House and Senate congressional leaders, 42 
agricultural and food organizations urged Congress to move forward with the FTAs, arguing that 
other countries throughout the world are negotiating and implementing free trade agreements and 
that U.S. exporters are losing market share as a result.73 They argue that Colombia has been the 
largest market in South America for U.S. agricultural exports over the past five years and that the 
U.S.-Colombia FTA would result in U.S. agricultural export gains of more than $815 million per 
year after full implementation. They are concerned that the FTA between Colombia and Canada 
that is expected to be implemented before the end of 2010 will cause U.S. agricultural exports to 
Colombia to fall. U.S. wheat producers estimate that the U.S. share of the Colombian wheat 
import market could fall from about 70% to 30% if Colombia’s FTA with Canada is 
implemented.74 
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